A Motion for Trial De Novo Is No Longer Enough: The Third District Joins the Fourth in Enforcing Rule 1.820(h) to the Letter
The Third District Court of Appeal’s May 13, 2026 decision in Sanchez v. People’s Trust Insurance Company is the second appellate confirmation in a calendar year that the 2024 amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) means precisely what it says. A motion for trial de novo, standing alone, will not preserve a party’s right to contest a non-binding arbitrator’s decision. The rule now requires a separately captioned notice of rejection, filed with the request for trial and within twenty days of service of the arbitrator’s written decision. Anything short of that, however reasonable in spirit, is fatal.
The Procedural Path That Closed the Courthouse Door
The underlying dispute was a routine first-party homeowner’s insurance breach-of-contract action arising from an alleged wind loss. The trial court referred the case to non-binding arbitration under section 44.103, Florida Statutes, and the arbitrator filed an order finding that the carrier owed nothing. Two days later, the insured filed a Motion for Trial De Novo, citing both section 44.103(5) and a version of Rule 1.820(h) that had been superseded by amendment two months before the arbitrator’s order. The motion requested a trial de novo as to all claims heard and decided in arbitration. What it did not do was state, in any form, that the arbitrator’s decision was rejected.
The trial court initially set the case for trial, evidently treating the motion as sufficient. The carrier moved for entry of an order adopting the arbitration decision and for final judgment, citing the amended rule. Twelve days after that motion was filed, and well outside the twenty-day window, the insured filed an Amended Motion for Trial De Novo, appending express language rejecting the arbitration award in an abundance of caution. The trial court granted the carrier’s motion, entered final judgment, and the appellate court affirmed.
What the 2024 Amendment Actually Changed
Before the Florida Supreme Court’s 2024 amendment, Rule 1.820(h) required only the timely filing of a motion for trial to contest the arbitrator’s findings. The amendment retitled the rule “Notice of Rejection of the Arbitration Decision and Request for Trial,” and rewrote its operative provisions in language that admits of no flexibility. A party rejecting the arbitration decision must file a notice of rejection and a request for trial in the same document. The rule then states, in terms that became the centerpiece of the Third District’s analysis, that no action or inaction by any party, other than the filing of the notice, will be deemed a rejection of the arbitration decision. If no notice is filed within twenty days, the decision must be referred to the presiding judge for entry of orders and judgments consistent with the arbitrator’s findings.
The Florida Supreme Court did not bury the change. In its amendment opinion, the Court underscored that an arbitration decision will be deemed rejected only if a notice of rejection and a request for trial are filed within 20 days. The Court’s use of the word only was deliberate. It signaled a move away from any equitable or substantial-compliance reading of the rule and toward what the Fourth District has since described as a bright-line and easy-to-follow requirement designed to ensure predictability and consistency.
The Substantial Compliance Argument and Why It Failed
The insured’s principal argument on appeal was that the original motion substantially complied with the rule because it cited the relevant statute and rule, requested a trial de novo, and left no doubt as to its purpose. The Third District rejected the argument on textual grounds, and did so without hesitation. The rule’s prohibition on treating any action or inaction other than the filing of the notice as a rejection of the arbitration decision forecloses the substantial compliance theory entirely. The panel invoked the supremacy-of-text principle endorsed in Boyle v. Samotin, observing that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey in their context is what the text means. The drafters of the amended rule contemplated the very argument the insured advanced and rejected it in advance.
The court also dispatched the related argument that section 44.103(5), which speaks only of a request for trial de novo without mentioning a notice of rejection, governs over the more demanding rule. The Third District treated the statute and the rule as complementary rather than competing, on the well-settled principle that procedural rules are construed in harmony with their enabling statutes and that no rule should be construed in a way that renders another rule meaningless. A reading of the statute that excused compliance with the rule’s notice requirement would do exactly that. The two are read together, and the more specific procedural rule governs the mechanics of perfecting the request for trial.
Alignment with the Fourth District
The Third District expressly joined the Fourth District’s 2025 decision in People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Hernandez, which addressed and rejected the identical substantial compliance theory on indistinguishable facts. The Fourth District’s opinion in Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Rouse framed the policy rationale that two districts have now adopted. The amended rule exists to eliminate the case-by-case litigation over whether a particular filing was sufficient to contest an arbitration award. With the Third District now in alignment, there is no Florida appellate authority going the other way, and the prospect of a meaningful intra-district split appears remote.
The Sanchez panel did note, in its opening footnote, that proposed amendments to Rule 1.820 are presently pending before the Florida Supreme Court in In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820, SC2026-0040, and that adoption of the proposed amendments could operate as a broader return to the rule’s pre-2024 form. That observation does not soften the present holding. The rule in force is the rule that applies, and any practitioner who assumes the Supreme Court will retreat from its 2024 position before the next arbitration decision lands on his desk is taking an unnecessary risk with his client’s case.
Practical Consequences for Counsel
The practical takeaway is straightforward and unforgiving. Any litigant whose case has been referred to non-binding arbitration under section 44.103 must calendar the twenty-day rejection deadline from the moment the arbitrator’s written decision is served. The filing that perfects the rejection must, in a single document, contain both an express notice of rejection of the arbitration decision and a request for trial. Citation to the rule and the statute, by themselves, will not do. A motion for trial de novo, by itself, will not do. The word rejection, or its functional equivalent in unmistakable terms, must appear on the face of the filing.
Lawyers who have practiced under the prior rule for years should not assume that the motion for trial de novo they have always filed will suffice. It will not. The form files in circulation throughout the bar predate the 2024 amendment and reflect a rule that no longer exists. A motion for trial de novo filed without the accompanying notice of rejection is a defective filing, and the twenty-day clock does not stop running while counsel discovers the omission. The substantive merits of the position the party wished to assert at trial are irrelevant once the deadline passes.
The prevailing party in arbitration should not wait. Once the twentieth day has come and gone without a notice of rejection on file, the prevailing party is entitled to move for entry of an order adopting the arbitration decision and for final judgment. That is the motion the carrier filed in Sanchez, and the one the trial court granted.
Alex P. Rosenthal is the principal of Rosenthal Law Group, a boutique commercial litigation firm based in Weston, Florida. The firm represents plaintiffs and defendants in commercial, landlord-tenant, insurance coverage, post-judgment collection, and appellate matters throughout Florida. This commentary discusses Sanchez v. People’s Trust Insurance Company, No. 3D25-0336 (Fla. 3d DCA May 13, 2026). It is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship. Readers with questions about a specific matter are encouraged to contact the firm directly.